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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002598

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EUR/RPM FOR HEATHER NICKERSON, EUR/ERA FOR NATHANIEL DEAN,
EUR/SE, EUR/SCE FOR AMBASSADOR WISNER

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TAGS: AF EU MARR PREL TU NATO

SUBJECT: TURKEY: KOSOVO ESDP MISSION UNDER CLOUD OF
TURKISH FRUSTRATION WITH NATO-EU RELATIONS

REF: A. BRUSSELS 3120

1B. BRUSSELS 3050
1C. USNATO 541

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: Turkey's so far unrequited desire for more direct participation in ESDP decision-making and access to EDA continues to cast a shadow over ESDP mission planning for Kosovo (ref a). Foreign Ministry officials appear unimpressed with EU and French ideas for improving NATO-EU relations. The MFA is not ready to be flexible in its approach to NATO-EU relations in general and NATO-EU collaboration in Kosovo in particular. Turkey will likely react to any informal attempts to arrange NATO support for the Kosovo operation by blocking Cyprus' participation or threatening to withdraw its own troops from KFOR. End Summary.

12. (C) In October 10 discussions with us, MFA NATO Affairs Department Head Ihsan Kiziltan welcomed high-level engagement at the EU, including by the Portuguese presidency, to address Turkish concerns, noting that it was a positive sign that Ankara's views are being taken into consideration (ref b). He described the French proposal at NATO (ref c) and recent contacts between Turkey and EU staff (including with Robert Cooper and Claude Francois Arnould) as constructive, but ultimately unsatisfactory. Kiziltan characterized the EU's offer for improved consultations with Turkey and other non-EU NATO Allies as repackaging of earlier commitments made under the Nice Treaty's implementation document. "There's a lot of back and forth, but at the end of the day, we're still at the same place," Kiziltan stated. Kiziltan's boss, MFA NATO Deputy Director General Serdar Kilic, made similar comments to us in early September.

13. (C) In Turkey's view, the EU has yet to address Turkey's request to approve the administrative arrangements for Turkey's relationship with the EDA, and conclude a security agreement with the EU. Kiziltan stressed that the absence of a security agreement with the EU goes beyond NATO-EU relations since it is also preventing Turkey from participating in the EU's 7th Framework Program related to scientific cooperation, which Turkey is partly funding.

14. (C) Kiziltan stated that Turkey supports an EU mission to take on policing responsibilities in Kosovo, and has signaled an interest to contribute toward that mission, but emphasized

that NATO's military and intelligence support for the EU mission must be done through "existing modalities." Reinventing the wheel or developing ad hoc arrangements for every mission is not practical, and undermines the whole rationale for an agree framework on NATO-EU cooperation, he stressed.

¶ 5. (C) Kiziltan also maintained that there should be no linkage between Turkey's request for a security agreement with the EU and any potential Cypriot interest in a security agreement with NATO. He stated that the Berlin Plus arrangements were concluded at a time when all parties knew that Cyprus was going to join the EU, and was designed precisely to prevent the "Cyprus Question" from "poisoning" NATO-EU cooperation. All parties involved in establishing the existing modalities were well aware what they were signing up to, Kiziltan concluded, and they need to live with those decisions.

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WILSON